February 2012 IAEA Report on Iran: An Initial Review

Posted on February 24, 2012 by

The Natanz enrichment complex.

(UPDATED at 7:50pm EST)

By Peter Crail and Daryl G. Kimball

The latest quarterly IAEA report on Iran is now in circulation and provides an updated summary of Iran’s nuclear activities and capabilities. The Feb. 24 report suggests that Iran is continuing to make steady progress expanding its enrichment capabilities, but it does not identify any breakthroughs. It also confirms initial impressions that Iran’s announcements last week on a series of “nuclear advances” were hyped. Here is our brief summary of key takeaways: Continue reading →

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Iran Responds to P5+1 Offer for New Talks

Posted on February 15, 2012 by

Image Source: The Guardian

By Peter Crail

Iran’s formal response to the P5+1 expressing a willingness to discuss its nuclear program helps pave the way for the first such meeting in over a year.

The two sides should now work to begin sustained negotiations aimed at ensuring that Iran meets its nonproliferation obligations. Another P5+1 round with Iran is a good start, but by itself will not likely produce a long-term deal that resolves the key issues.

Resolving the nuclear issue will require sufficient pressure and inducements to convince Iran’s current and future leaders they stand to gain more from forgoing nuclear weapons than from any decision to build them.

A near-term goal should be to test Iran’s claim that it would be willing to stop producing uranium enriched to 20 percent if it received fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor. A stockpile of 20 percent-enriched uranium would allow Iran to shorten its time frame to produce weapons; Washington should not forgo any opportunities to reduce that risk.

The most critical objectives of the dialogue will be to secure more intrusive access by the IAEA to all of Iran’s nuclear-related activities and to convince Tehran to finally address the agency’s questions about its weapons-related work. Iran stands to benefit from providing such cooperation, including by receiving assistance for a dedicated peaceful nuclear energy program.

A permanent uranium-enrichment halt would be beneficial and very welcome, but it is not necessary to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran, and should not become a condition for further talks. A permanent halt to Iranian enrichment is also not realistic given the strong support for enrichment across the political spectrum in Iran. Limiting enrichment levels to normal reactor fuel grade and tying enrichment amounts to the actual needs of Iran’s nuclear power plants could provide an acceptable compromise that would still achieve U.S. nonproliferation goals.

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Possible North Korean Nuke Test Shows Power of CTBT Monitoring System

Posted on February 3, 2012 by

By Tom Z. Collina

A new study in the March 2012 issue of Science & Global Security suggests that North Korea carried out a small nuclear explosive test in May 2010. If true, this would be the third nuclear test by North Korea and its first that was not announced.

CTBTO radionuclide monitoring station, Okinawa, Japan

The study argues that because there was no seismic reading to indicate a nuclear explosion at that time, the explosive yield of any such event would have been less than 50 tons (or .05 kilotons). The fact that a test this small could have been detected at all is a promising sign for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification system.

The paper, authored by Lars-Erik De Geer, Research Director at the Swedish Defense Research Agency, Stockholm, bases its conclusion on radionuclide data from May 2010 collected at stations in South Korea, Japan and Russia that are part of the CTBT International Monitoring System (IMS) and national nuclear monitoring networks. In addition to radionuclides (radioactive gases), the IMS detects seismic (ground shock), hydroacoustic (water), infrasound, and other signals.

De Geer argues in his paper that: “The fact that such experiments were still detected by another technology in the currently evolving CTBT verification system … suggests that there are fewer and fewer grounds for countries to refuse ratifying the CTBT by questioning the effectiveness of its verification regime.”

It is also important to note that when the CTBT does enter into force, ambiguous events such as these in states of concern would very likely lead to requests for on-site inspections to resolve concerns about clandestine nuclear testing. Although the CTBT has been signed by 182 countries and ratified by 156, and the IMS is nearly complete and operational, 8 more states including the United States and China, must ratify to trigger its formal entry into force.

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U.S. Intelligence Assessment of Iran’s Nuclear Program: Essentials Remain the Same

Posted on January 31, 2012 by

By Greg Thielmann

DNI James Clapper Testifies at Jan. 31 Senate Intelligence Committee Hearing

The United States’ intelligence community’s judgments on Iran’s nuclear program have not fundamentally changed from those revealed in its controversial 2007 National Intelligence Estimate. In presenting the intelligence community’s annual “Worldwide Threat Assessment” to the Senate Committee on Intelligence on January 31, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper used language identical to that used in recent years on a number of critical points:

  •  We continue to assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.
  • Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons, making the central issue its political will to do so. These [technical] advancements contribute to our judgment that Iran is technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon, if it so chooses.
  • We judge Iran’s nuclear decision making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran.

Clapper’s testimony acknowledged Iran’s additional accumulation of low-enriched uranium at both the 3.5 percent and 20 percent level and the start of enrichment at its second enrichment plant near Qom.

The senior intelligence officials also endorsed the November 2011 IAEA report as being the best public accounting to date of Iran’s nuclear activities, including information “relevant to possible military dimensions.”

However, the U.S. intelligence community’s assessment of Iran’s post-2003 nuclear activities has apparently not convinced it that Tehran has decided to build a nuclear weapon.  Moreover, Clapper’s testimony suggests that Iran has the domestic capabilities eventually to do so, regardless of foreign actions taken against it. The “central issue” is thus affecting political will.

Senators at the public Congressional hearing did not press for an intelligence judgment on how growing threats of military action influence the Iranian regime’s political will.

But given that Iranian pride and nationalism exist across the domestic political spectrum, it would be foolish to conclude that Tehran will capitulate only in response to increased costs for defying the international community. If a negotiated agreement is possible, it will also have to include something that Tehran perceives as a benefit.

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Pentagon Budget Delays Significant Decisions on Trimming Excessive, Expensive Cold War Nuclear Forces

Posted on January 26, 2012 by

HMS Vanguard launches US-supplied Trident II D5 SLBM off Florida in October 2005. (Image Source: FAS.org.)

By Daryl G. Kimball

(Note: this post was updated on Jan. 27)

Today, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta issued a whitepaper outlining the budgetary implications of the Obama administration’s new defense strategic guidance and Congressionally-mandated deficit reduction measures, including the effect on some U.S. nuclear weapons strategic delivery systems.

The Jan. 5 strategic guidance review correctly states that: “It is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our inventory as well as their role in U.S. national security strategy.”

However, Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter noted that: “there are no cuts made to the nuclear force in this budget,” in large part because the White House is still making decisions about “the size and the shape of the arsenal in the future.”

The Pentagon whitepaper only calls for delaying procurement of a new, proposed Ohio-class replacement nuclear-armed submarine by two years, which could (according to earlier Pentagon figures) save some $6-7 billion in the next ten years, but would not reduce the overall cost of the program, which the Pentagon puts at an estimated $350 billion or more over its 50-year lifespan.

The delay in the new strategic submarine program is a step in the right direction, but falls short of the more significant savings that can be achieved by rightsizing U.S. nuclear forces to reflect the realities of the new century.

For more significant savings, the Pentagon must reduce the total number of new subs it plans to buy in the coming years. By delaying procurement of new replacement subs by two years as now planned, and by reducing the current Trident nuclear-armed sub fleet from 14 to eight or fewer boats, and building no more than eight new nuclear-armed subs, the United States could save roughly $20 billion over 10 years, and $120 billion over the 50-year lifespan of the program.

The delay does mean that long-range budget decisions on the new strategic sub and other strategic nuclear weapons systems will be determined by updated Presidential nuclear weapons policy guidance, not the other way around.

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Negotiating with Iran: “Buy Low, Sell High”

Posted on January 17, 2012 by

By Greg Thielmann

U.S. policy-makers grappling with the Iranian nuclear challenge require the same psychological insight required for success in playing the stock market. The advice, “buy low, sell high,” may be obvious, but it is difficult to apply in practice, because investors’ emotions lead them in exactly the opposite direction.

When stock prices are rising, one feels good and wants to hold on to stocks in order to maximize the higher returns; when the prices are falling, one feels like selling before any more value is lost. The trick is not to be too greedy or too desperate and let the head control the game.

The current political trend on U.S. Iran policy is to relish news of financial difficulties in Iran brought about by the tightening sanctions, and trust that growing economic pressure and covert action can force Iranian capitulation.

But the economic difficulties Iran is encountering should be a spur to re-energize the diplomatic track, for realists understand that Iranians will not respond positively to threats and violence. The fruits of economic pressure can only be harvested through diplomatic engagement and willingness to compromise.

Another way to process recent developments emotionally is to feel fear about the threat of war and anger at provocative actions. Tensions have significantly increased during the last few weeks over Tehran’s boasts of nuclear program achievements, its threat to close off access to the Persian Gulf, its continuing support of violence in the Levant and abuse of human rights at home.

From Tehran’s perspective, the imposition of unilateral sanctions on Iran’s central bank, assassinations and mysterious explosions, and belligerent rhetoric from Republican presidential candidates in the United States lead to perceptions that a virtual war is already underway and a full-scale military attack may soon be launched.

Historical perspective is urgently required to steady the nerves. The Cold War demonstrated that responses to provocations can be firm without leading to war and common ground between ideological antagonists can be found without resolving all serious differences. Indeed, Iran’s constructive contributions to the December 2001 Bonn Agreement on Afghanistan provide a pertinent reminder that positive diplomatic results from negotiating with the Islamic Republic are not impossible.

However, in order to engage effectively, the United States and its P5+1 partners need to distinguish optimal from essential negotiating goals and offer the Iranian regime a face-saving off-ramp from the defiant and destructive course it is on.  Tehran’s portrayal of U.S. objectives as regime change and subjugation must be explicitly countered by both U.S. declaration and deed.

The debate and on-again-off-again talks on “Iranian nuclear issue” has been going on so long, we often forget where we have been and where we need to go. The road to resolving the nuclear issue needs to start with a reformulation of the issues at hand. The principal U.S. objective in the dispute is not to stop Iranian now well-established uranium enrichment program and cripple Iran’s nuclear energy program or to overthrow the Iranian regime; it is to win Tehran’s agreement to carry out and strengthen its safeguards commitments to the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure it is not pursuing nuclear weapons.

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Don’t neglect the Biological Weapons Convention

Posted on January 12, 2012 by

Paul van den IJssel of the Netherlands, president of the 2011 BWC Review Conference, and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton (Image Source: U.S. Mission to Geneva)

By Oliver Meier

The December 2011 review conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) demonstrated the danger of the bioweapons ban drifting into irrelevance. Standstill was the motto of the meeting. Only incremental improvements on some procedural issues were achieved. Between now and the next review conference in 2016, it is going to be near to impossible to take decisions that will strengthen the treaty. Representatives of the 103 states-parties participating in Geneva missed an important opportunity to modernize the almost 40-year-old accord.

There are many reasons for concern about a weak biological weapons ban. Biotechnology is advancing at an incredible speed, making it easier to develop ever more powerful biological weapons, also for terrorists and other non-state actors. Activities that could be perceived as attempts to build bioweapons, such as biodefense programs, are not transparent enough. This leads to mistrust that could undermine the taboo against biological weapons.

The BWC is ill-equipped to address these dangers. There is no mechanism that would ring an alarm bell in case one of its 165 members is suspected of developing biological weapons. The regime is not supported by an international organization which keeps a watch over how states-parties implement the accord and which evaluates the impact of new technical and scientific developments on the prohibition of biological weapons.

The Final Document adopted at the review conference contains next to nothing to address these challenges. This disappointing outcome follows two review conferences which resulted in some modest innovations, aimed at better implementation of the BWC.

After the failure of negotiations on a verification protocol in 2001, states-parties in 2002 initiated a process of annual meetings of experts and diplomats between the quinquennial review conferences, intended to discuss topics of relevance to the bioweapons ban. At the next review conference in 2006, the Implementation Support Unit, a three-person secretariat to assist member states, was created.

The 2011 conference simply extended these previous arrangements. There were major disagreements on the next logical steps in the evolution of the regime, such as allowing annual meetings of states-parties to take legally-binding decisions, expanding the size and mandate of the ISU and reforming the confidence-building measures, which provide at least for some basic transparency on sensitive activities. And there is still no prospect for talks on a verification and transparency mechanism.

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