Next Steps on Iran After Baghdad and the New IAEA Report

Posted on May 25, 2012 by

By Daryl G. Kimball

This week in Baghdad, the P5+1 group (the United States, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the U.K.)–led by EU Foreign Policy chief Catherine Ashton–met for two days with the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, Saeed Jalili, and his team on Tehran’s disputed nuclear program.

As the diplomats met inside a guest house in the fortified Green Zone, the world waited anxiously for some tangible progress. While each side presented revised versions of earlier proposals to resolve their respective concerns, the meeting concluded without an agreement on concrete confidence-building steps, and they announced they will meet again in Moscow June 18-19.

Given the infrequency of serious, direct talks with Tehran, the outcome in Baghdad is not surprising. Nevertheless, an initial confidence building deal is still within reach if both sides show some flexibility.

The top priority must continue to be–as the P5+1 insists–that Iran halts its accumulation of 20 percent-enriched uranium (which is above normal fuel-grade and closer to weapons grade) in exchange for fuel assemblies for its Tehran Research Reactor.

This would be a win-win for both sides and reinforce the principle that Iran will only enrich according to its civilian power needs, and could serve as a basis for a broader deal to limit the size and scope of its enrichment program as a whole. A deal to halt enrichment above normal fuel grade would provide negotiators with more time and space to address other key issues.

While an agreement on initial confidence building steps was not reached in Baghdad, it is clear that both sides are exchanging serious proposals that could produce results in the next round. For its part, Iran must follow though on the tentative deal with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on inspections of key sites and personnel to ensure that any weapons-related experiments have been discontinued and the P5+1 must indicate what specific steps Iran must take on its nuclear program in order to delay additional international sanctions measures and begin to remove those already in place.

Iran clearly wants to avoid tougher sanctions–particularly the European oil embargo set to begin next month–but the P5+1 are unlikely to give up that leverage before tangible steps are taken by Iran, such as giving the IAEA necessary access to sites and personnel and halting enrichment to 20% in exchange for fuel supplies for its Tehran Research Reactor.

Iran made it clear once again in Baghdad that it will not compromise its so-called right to enrich uranium.

But under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, such rights do come with responsibilities. The position of United States and its negotiating partners has been–correctly–that under very strict conditions Iran would, sometime in the future, having responded to the international community’s concerns about nuclear weapons-related experiments, have such a right under IAEA inspections.

The IAEA’s New Report on the Iranian Nuclear Program

The importance of full Iranian cooperation with the IAEA and progress on concrete confidence building steps in Moscow was further underscored by today’s report from the IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano to the Board of Governors.

The IAEA’s May 25 report indicates that Iran continues to make steady progress enriching uranium to 5% U-235 (from 5451 kg in Feb. 2012 to 6197 in May 2012) and 20% U-235 (from 95.4 kg to 145.6 kg), but has still not installed more advanced centrifuges that could significantly increase its uranium enrichment output.

And, despite recent progress towards an agreement on a “structured approach” with the IAEA to resolve outstanding questions about experiments with possible military dimensions, the IAEA report makes it clear that Tehran is still not providing the information necessary for the Agency to resolve outstanding concerns.

The IAEA report also notes that Iran appears to be operating a heavy water production plant and continuing construction on a heavy water reactor now being built near Arak, which could be used to produce plutonium for bombs.

The Agency is also reporting that it has gathered additional information since its November 2011 report that “further corroborates its analysis” about possible experiments at the Parchin site, and the Agency continues to seek prompt access to that site.

The Director General “invites Iran to expedite final agreement on the structured approach, as agreed with Mr Jalili in Tehran on 21 May, 2012, and urges Iran to engage the Agency on the substance of these issues as soon as possible, including by providing early access to the Parchin site.”

In other words, it is past time for Iran’s supreme leader and his team to provide the transparency necessary to ensure that his religious fatwa against nuclear weapons is genuine. If, as the Iranians want, some delay of additional sanctions down the road, Iran must promptly follow-though on the tentative deal with the IAEA on inspections to verify that any weapons-related experiments have been discontinued and halt 20% enrichment at all of its enrichment facilities in exchange for fuel supplies for its Tehran Research Reactor.

Both sides need to focus on achieving concrete results at the next round of talks in Moscow to sustain progress toward the overdue actions necessary to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.

Posted in Iran, Middle East, Non-proliferation, Nuclear Weapons | Leave a comment

Cartwright’s Disarming Approach to Missile Defense

Posted on May 24, 2012 by

The NATO summit in Chicago ended, as expected, with the Alliance and Russia at loggerheads on missile defense. With great fanfare, NATO inaugurated the first phase of its missile interceptor system. In response, Russia skipped the summit, tested a new long-range ballistic missile, and threatened to attack parts of the NATO missile interceptor system to be deployed in Eastern Europe. This is not progress.

Yet the United States and Russia must solve the missile defense puzzle if they hope to get on with reducing their nuclear arsenals below the limits set by the 2010 New START Treaty. Both nations have a keen interest in reducing the nuclear threats they face, stopping nuclear proliferation and terrorism, and redirecting scare dollars to higher defense priorities.

A new report, chaired by former STRATCOM commander Gen. James Cartwright, who oversaw U.S. nuclear forces under President George W. Bush and then served as vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, calls for deep reductions in U.S. and Russian arsenals. The report, which laments that differences over missile defense are blocking the arms reduction process, includes a little-noticed but potentially game-changing approach to breaking the current impasse.

Gen. Cartwright and his coauthors go after the root cause of the problem: Moscow, they say, is not just concerned that the European missile system might be capable of intercepting a few Russian missiles.  Rather, Russian leaders are worried about the U.S. capability to launch a pre-emptive nuclear attack and then use strategic missile interceptors planned for deployment in 2020 (the SM-3 IIB) and thereafter to deny a Russian retaliatory strike.

To those outside the Russian military, this fear sounds misplaced. It is unthinkable that the United States would launch a first strike against Russia or anyone else. Yet Cold War worst-case planning lives on, according to Gen. Cartwright (who was directly involved in such planning), and still drives the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship.  As the report puts it, “The bilateral nuclear arms control process and even the broader U.S.-Russian relationship has stalled” over this misunderstood Russian fear.

If fear of a U.S. surprise first strike that could “decapitate” Moscow’s nuclear forces is really driving Russian thinking, then small-bore proposals, such as limiting the capability of U.S. interceptors in Europe, will not succeed. Instead, Gen. Cartwright is proposing to fundamentally change U.S. nuclear posture to remove any credible threat of a U.S. pre-emptive first strike.

“By removing the technical threat of a surprise U.S. nuclear first strike, the United States could no longer theoretically decimate the bulk of Russia’s strategic forces, and the specter of U.S. missile defenses mopping up a small number of surviving Russian missiles after the strike would evaporate,” the study says.

How to remove this outdated first-strike threat is the focus of Gen. Cartwright’s proposal, which includes making an 80 percent reduction in U.S. nuclear forces, taking those forces off alert, and retiring all U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs. Once this is done, “U.S. missile defense deployment would not pose nearly as great a technical threat to Russia, improving the prospects for a new round of fruitful U.S.-Russian nuclear arms negotiations,” the report says.

This is a very different approach to untangling missile defense than has been taken so far. Yet it is high time to shift U.S. forces away from their current capability to launch a surprise first strike, even if no one on this side of the Atlantic believes that to be even a remote possibility. From a hard-boiled military perspective, capability is everything and, according to Gen. Cartwright, this is a capability we no longer need.

The Obama administration is in the process of reviewing U.S. nuclear weapons policy to formulate its position for the next round of arms control talks. Removing any credible threat of a first strike against Moscow, along the lines that Gen. Cartwright suggests, should be considered as a key part of the next round of talks to facilitate future bilateral arms reductions and missile defense cooperation.

Twenty years after the Cold War’s end, there’s no need for Russian leaders to be lying awake at night worrying about a U.S. first strike, especially if that fear is standing in the way of reducing the Russian nuclear threat to the United States. The United States has stressed time and again that its nuclear forces and missile interceptors are not aimed at Russia. It’s time to bring U.S. nuclear force structure in line with its declaratory nuclear policy. —TOM Z. COLLINA

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NATO On Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities Missed and Next Steps Forward

Posted on May 21, 2012 by

By Daryl G. Kimball, Oliver Meier, and Paul Ingram

At their May 20-21 summit in Chicago, NATO leaders missed an important opportunity to change the Alliance’s outdated nuclear policy and open the way to improving European security by the removal of the remaining 180 U.S. nuclear bombs in Europe, which serve no practical military value for the defense of the Alliance.

The Alliance’s Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) was launched at NATO’s Lisbon summit in November 2010 primarily to resolve differences among allies on the future role of nuclear weapons. The result is an indecisive document that dodges the main issues separating allies around nuclear deterrence and it fails to advance President Obama’s and the Alliance’s stated goal of reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons.

Muddled Declaratory Policy

In the DDPR, NATO allies recognize that negative security assurances can have “a positive effect” in discouraging proliferation by assuring non-nuclear weapon states that they will not be subject to nuclear blackmail or attack. Yet, NATO fails to draw the right lessons from this analysis.

At the insistence of France, there is no unified policy on the basic purpose of nuclear weapons for the Alliance. Instead, the DDPR repeats the vague phrase from the 2010 Strategic Concept: “The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote.”

The DDPR goes on to recognize that the three owners of nuclear weapons within NATO (the United States, the U.K., and France) will determine how and when to use or threaten to use their nuclear weapons: “Allies note that the states that have assigned nuclear weapons to NATO apply to these weapons the assurances they have each offered on a national basis, including the separate conditions each state has attached to these assurances.” It erroneously characterizes this as giving comfort to non-nuclear weapon states in conformity with their NPT obligations, as France has so far resisted giving any such guarantees.

This leaves NATO’s joint nuclear policy in a mess, with different policies governing those nuclear weapons assigned to NATO depending upon the state that owns them, and other NATO states having no say in the matter.

At Chicago, NATO leaders should have clarified that the fundamental purpose of nuclear weapons for the entire Alliance is to deter a nuclear attack by a potential adversary and that all of NATO pledges not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against members of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that are non-nuclear-weapon states.

Such a policy would have brought NATO into alignment with the nuclear doctrine of the United Kingdom and with the results of the 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review Report, which states that: “the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear forces is to deter nuclear attacks against the U.S. and our allies and partners.”

Such a formulation, if fully embraced by NATO, would have signaled the Alliance is serious about reducing the salience of nuclear weapons and is prepared to take concrete actions to fulfill its 2010 Lisbon summit pledge to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons.

Instead, the DDPR makes it clear that NATO will continue to maintain and even modernize the remaining 180 U.S. forward-deployed B-61 nuclear gravity bombs in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The DDPR notes that: “Allies … will ensure that all components of NATO’s nuclear deterrent remain safe, secure, and effective for as long as NATO remains a nuclear alliance.”

The life extension program for the B61 and upgrades to the dual-capable aircraft that can deliver them will come at significant financial cost. And because the B61 modernization program would increase the military capabilities of weapons deployed in Europe by improving accuracy on target, Russia might use this as an excuse to continue investing in the upkeep of its own tactical nuclear arsenal.

Dubious Linkages

As was expected, the DDPR conditions further progress in reducing the role and the number of forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe to progress in discussions with Russia on transparency measures on tactical nuclear weapons.

The DDPR says: “NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area.”

“Allies look forward to continuing to develop and exchange transparency and confidence-building ideas with the Russian Federation in the NATO-Russia Council, with the goal of developing detailed proposals on and increasing mutual understanding of NATO’s and Russia’s non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe.”

It is encouraging that a process to revise the nuclear status quo has finally begun: NATO members are finally prepared to discuss tactical nuclear arms control and transparency with Russia; and the DDPR now tasks the officials in Brussels to explore options for reduced reliance on the weapons.

However, NATO’s decision to hang on to these obsolete relics will not likely provide the meaningful leverage vis-à-vis Russia, which views its tactical nuclear weapons primarily as a means to compensate for NATO’s convention military superiority and Chinese forces. Because of the divisions in NATO over its nuclear deployments in Europe, and their likely withdrawal over the long-run, there is actually a perverse incentive for the Russians to stall on any agreement on tactical nuclear arsenals.

In order to put greater pressure on Russia to reciprocate, Alliance members must provide meaningful leadership.

Following the Chicago summit, President Obama and other Alliance political leaders should send a clearer signal that they will actually begin the process of withdrawing the existing U.S. tactical weapons from Europe and halt the planned modernization of the B61 nuclear gravity bombs assigned to NATO.

By agreeing to remove these nuclear relics from Europe and beginning the process with some early withdrawals of the B61s, NATO would eliminate Russia’s long-standing and cynical excuse not to begin discussions on tactical nuclear arms control, and increase pressure on Russia to account for and to further consolidate its own larger stockpile of battlefield nuclear bombs, which may number as many as 2,000.

Vague Requirements

The DDPR concludes that the alliance’s existing nuclear force posture “currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defense posture” and it refers to an unspecified “requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance,” but fails to explain what political or military function they actually serve.

It is past time for NATO to explicitly acknowledge that these battlefield nuclear bombs no longer serve any meaningful or credible military role in the defense of NATO. They do little, if anything, to assure allies who feel threatened by Russia.

As the current U.S. ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, wrote in Arms Control Today sixteen years ago:

“…U.S. nuclear weapons can now be removed from Europe—they no longer serve the political or military function they once did.”[i]

His statement is even more valid today.

The devastating power and collateral effects of such weapons make them inappropriate tools against non-nuclear targets, while the possible loss or theft of these weapons poses additional dangers.

Top U.S. officials, including White House adviser Gary Samore, have also acknowledged that “whatever military mission they serve could of course also be accomplished through the use of systems that are not tactical systems based in Europe.”

The DDPR itself implicitly acknowledges that the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence capabilities do not require the presence of the 180 B61 nuclear gravity bombs stationed in Europe, but instead, those requirements are met by the strategic nuclear arsenals of Alliance members.

The DDPR states that:  “The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; [and] the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France ….”

Bottom Line

The U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are more of a liability than an asset.

To engage Russia in a process that begins to reduce its far larger tactical nuclear arsenal, NATO must recapture that bold vision of the 1991-92 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives—which led the withdrawal and dismantlement of thousands of forward-deployed U.S. and Soviet tactical nuclear weapons.  Instead, NATO has revived an East-West mindset that makes decisions about the future of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe contingent upon Russian steps.

It is past time to complete the process that was begun two decades ago of withdrawing non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe to motivate Russia to follow suit.

[i]“Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Why Zero Is Better,” by Ivo H. Daalder, Arms Control Today, January/February 1993.

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East Coast Missile Defense: Not Ready for Prime Time

Posted on May 10, 2012 by

(Image Source: Missile Defense Agency – FTM-16 E2a Flight Test)

By Tom Z. Collina 

The House Armed Services Committee’s (HASC) May 9 vote to build a third strategic missile interceptor site on the East Coast by the end of 2015 is generating a great deal of controversy, and for good reason. A close look at the HASC proposal shows that it is premature at best.

House Republicans, such as Rep. Michael Turner (R-Ohio), are using a forthcoming classified report by the National Research Council (NRC) to justify their proposal for an East Coast site. However, Rep. Turner is cherry-picking the NRC’s results to support his position.

NRC’s recommendations make it clear that the current West Coast interceptor system is not effective, and would have to be completely redesigned, retested and rebuilt before it could be installed on the East Coast. HASC’s requirement to deploy the third site by late 2015 is thus highly unrealistic.

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NATO’s DDPR: What to Expect and What Needs to Be Done After the Chicago Summit

Posted on May 3, 2012 by

By Paul Ingram and Oliver Meier

NOTE: This post follows up on an article published in Arms Control Today, May 2, 2012

To the surprise of many, NATO foreign and defense ministers agreed on a draft text of the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) report during their April 18-19 Brussels meetings. The agreement on the 3½-page draft was possible because Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States presented other allies with a compromise proposal, which was adopted with only minor revisions.

Even though the document still has to be approved by heads of state and government at the May 20-21 Chicago summit, it is very likely that this classified draft will be adopted without major changes, according to confidential conversations with diplomats and officials from more than half a dozen NATO member states and from NATO headquarters.

The DDPR report apparently does not change any aspect of NATO’s current nuclear posture as outlined in the Strategic Concept agreed in Lisbon in November 2010. But some believe that it can provide the flexible basis for future revisions of NATO’s nuclear policy—and the deployment of some 180 U.S. nuclear gravity bombs in five European NATO countries—if and when the alliance chooses to act. The document was described by one official familiar with the deliberations as the foundation for change, but not the change itself.

Concrete adjustments, however, will not likely emerge in NATO nuclear planning or practices until well after the NATO summit—unless NATO leaders in Chicago give the sort of clear guidance for follow-on discussions that has been lacking up to now. Continue reading →

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Rep. Turner Undercut by Appropriators on CMRR

Posted on May 1, 2012 by

Image Source: U.S. Representative Michael Turner Photo

By Kelsey Davenport

Lawmakers attempting hold New START implementation hostage to budget increases were stuck a serious blow last week when the House and Senate Appropriations committees lined up in support of the administration’s decision to zero out funding for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility (CMRR) and delay construction of the building for at least five years.

Neither appropriations committee moved to restore any funding for the CMRR when they voted on the fiscal year 2013 budget for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The proposed facility is intended to support plutonium pit production activities at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico – which NNSA officials now say can be met with existing facilities.

Republican lawmakers, such as Representative Michael Turner (R–Ohio), claim that the administration’s decision to cut CMRR violates a commitment made by President Obama during the New START debate to fund “nuclear modernization” at levels outlined in 2010. Since then, the Congress has reduced funding for the administration’s budget requests for NNSA weapons activities and Congress approved the bipartisan Budget Control Act. Although the administration’s FY2013 $7.6 billion request for National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) weapons activities is 4% lower than projected in 2010, it is still  5% higher than the 2012 enacted budget–a large increase in tough budget times.

Nevertheless, in March of this year Rep. Turner introduced legislation which would block New START implementation until the administration certifies that NNSA weapons activities programs are being funded to the projected 2010 levels, including restoration of CMRR’s construction budget.

Rep. Turner may offer amendments along these lines to the House defense bill next week, despite testimony from NNSA and the Department of Defense that completing CMRR at this time is not necessary to maintain the nuclear stockpile and fiscally irresponsible, given budget constraints.

The appropriations votes further isolate Rep. Turner’s position. Even in the Republican controlled House, there was no move to restore funding for CMRR in committee. The accompanying report requested only that NNSA provide further information on the U.S.’s plutonium strategy during the delay period.

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U.S. Position on Iran Enrichment: More Public Recognition Than Policy Shift

Posted on April 30, 2012 by

EU's High Representative Catherine Ashton and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

By Peter Crail

An April 27 Los Angeles Times story reports that “U.S. officials said they might agree to let Iran continue enriching uranium up to 5% purity, which is the upper end of the range for most civilian uses, if its government agrees to the unrestricted inspections, strict oversight and numerous safeguards that the United Nations has long demanded.”

The story says that the prospect for such an arrangement “would be a significant concession” on the part of the United States and “a shift in the U.S. position that Iran must halt all enrichment activities.”

The conclusions drawn by the L.A. Times misreads the history of the U.S. position and U.S. efforts to resolve the Iran nuclear issue with the P5+1.

Although there has long been a preference on the part of the United States and many of its allies for zero enrichment in Iran (indeed, opposition to the spread of any uranium enrichment capability to any additional countries has been long-standing U.S. policy and an important nonproliferation principle), the potential to discuss with Iran the conditions under which it could continue enrichment is not new. In fact, it is built into the proposals that the P5+1 have offered Iran since 2006, spanning the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations.

Then as now, the P5+1 require Iran to suspend uranium enrichment. The 2006 proposal, and it’s 2008 update, include a review mechanism for that suspension to determine whether concerns over Iran’s nuclear activities had been fully resolved, thereby meeting key conditions under which Iran could potentially resume enrichment. That proposal is still on the table.

Such a review mechanism appears consistent with what a senior administration told the LA Times:

“A senior administration official said that if Iran fulfills U.S. and other world powers’ demands for strict enforcement of U.N. monitoring and safeguards, “there can be a discussion” of allowing low-level domestic enrichment, “and maybe we can get there, potentially.”

The shift by the Obama administration appears to be more a matter of its willingness to publicly state that there could be conditions under which Iran could maintain some enrichment capabilities, rather than a willingness to entertain the idea in the first place.

In March 2011, Secretary Clinton told the House Foreign Affairs Committee regarding Iran’s claimed right to enrichment, “it has been our position that under very strict conditions Iran would, sometime in the future, having responded to the international community’s concerns and irreversibly shut down its nuclear weapons program, have such a right under IAEA inspections.”

As White House WMD Coordinator Gary Samore said in an Arms Control Today interview the following month:

“What Secretary Clinton said has made explicit what has always been implicit in our policy, going back to the Bush administration, that if Iran were to satisfy the UN Security Council that its nuclear intentions were peaceful, then we would have no objection to Iran engaging in the full suite of peaceful nuclear activities.”

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