East Coast Missile Defense? First, Solve the Decoy Problem

Posted on April 26, 2012 by

By Tom Z. Collina

As the House Armed Services Committee marks up its version of the fiscal 2013 defense authorization bill, some strange proposals are emerging. Perhaps the oddest, from Rep. Michael Turner (R-Ohio), chair of the strategic forces subcommittee, is to build another ground-based missile defense (GMD) site on the east coast by 2015.

But wait. The United States already has two GMD sites on the west coast, with 30 interceptors deployed in California and Alaska, to handle an attack from North Korea. And the Obama administration is building another interceptor system in Europe, known as the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA), to handle attacks from Iran. Never mind that neither country has yet deployed long-range missiles that could reach the United States.

Before we rush out and build another GMD site on Rehoboth beach, lets see how the current systems are doing.

Even on the surface, it is clear that missile defense is a hard job. The GMD system has not had a successful intercept test against a cooperative target since 2008, with two failures in 2010, and the PAA’s Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) IB failed its first flight test in 2011.

But dig a little deeper and you’ll find that neither system has been tested against a realistic target including decoys.

Continue reading →

Posted in Missile Defense, Nuclear Weapons | Tagged | 2 Comments

Kissinger, Scowcroft Oped on Obama Nuclear Policy Review Overlooks Key Facts

Posted on April 23, 2012 by

By Daryl G. Kimball

Trident D-5 missile fails to perform in flight test.

Sometimes former national security heavyweights still have some insights on nuclear weapons policy–sometimes they don’t.

In an oped in The Washington Post today, Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and General Brent Scowcroft make the incorrect presumption that the Barack Obama administration’s ongoing review of nuclear force requirements and planning for the next round of nuclear reductions is based on “an abstract preconceived determination” for nuclear weapons policy.

The two former national security officials cite a February Associated Press report on the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Implementation Study, which cited an unnamed source who erroneously claimed that President Obama had ordered the Pentagon to develop plans to reduce the deployed strategic arsenal to 300 warheads. That report has been dismissed by senior administration officials, who called it “wildly overwritten.”

Kissinger and Scowcroft then proceed in their oped to state some standard principles for consideration as the United States considers further nuclear reductions, all of which are specifically addressed in the NPR.

They should both know better or at least hire better research assistants. Just last week, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs Madelyn Creedon testified before the House Armed Services Committee and said:

“.. the presidentially directed NPR follow-on analysis … is underway. This analysis will culminate in updated nuclear guidance, which will in turn inform the Administration’s policy decisions regarding potential future nuclear weapons reductions while strengthening deterrence of regional adversaries, enhancing strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, and continuing assurance of our allies and partners. The analysis will not revisit the principles or conclusions of the NPR; rather, it is a key component of the NPR’s implementation. 
 
In fact, in performing this analysis, we focused on achieving the five strategic objectives that the Nuclear Posture Review established: 
 
· Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; 
 
· Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national strategy; 
 
· Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; 
 
· Strengthening deterrence and assuring U.S. allies and partners; and 
 
· Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. 
 
Continue reading →

Posted in Nuclear Weapons, Uncategorized | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment

Seven Steps on the Way Towards a Peaceful Resolution of the Conflict Over Iran’s Nuclear Activities

Posted on April 20, 2012 by

Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili and EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton in Istanbul

By Michael Brzoska, Oliver Meier, and Götz Neuneck

In a climate of escalation, the outline of a lasting and peaceful resolution of the conflict over Iran’s nuclear activities can be sketched with a good degree of clarity and certainty. Seven necessary elements of a compromise package can be condensed from the many political debates and expert discussions about Iran’s nuclear program. All of these should be acceptable to the United States, the EU and Iran.

However, as is often the case in such situations, the major problem is not defining the outline of a sustainable solution, but reaching it. While a compromise outcome is fairly simple to describe, the way towards such a solution is strewn with political obstacles, as the level of mistrust on both sides remains extremely high. Furthermore, it is by no means certain that leaders on both sides possess the political will and sufficient clout to take the risks involved in seeking a jointly acceptable solution.

Yet, the alternatives are even worse. Continuing the current course of confrontation instigates Iran to improve its capability to build nuclear weapons if it chose to do so. Military escalation is not likely to lead to a solution of the conflict and increases the danger of an escalation of violence in the region.

Elements of a Solution to the Dispute over Iran’s Nuclear Activities

What elements would a sustainable compromise package that is acceptable to both the West and to the Iranian leadership have to contain?

First, the West and the international community more broadly need to accept that enrichment of uranium takes place in Iran. A permanent abandonment of enrichment, as some have called for, is unrealistic, if only because there are no political actors in Iran would support such a step. Thus, Iran must be allowed to enrich uranium for civil purposes and in compliance with extended safeguards commitments.

However, if Iran wishes the United States and the EU member states to accept a compromise that includes uranium enrichment, it will also have to be prepared to take steps to assure that such activities are for peaceful purposes only.

As the second element of a stable settlement, Iran must ratify and implement in a binding fashion an Additional Protocol for the inspection of its nuclear activities. In contrast to the “comprehensive safeguards protocol”, which restricts the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the inspection of declared facilities and nuclear material, the Additional Protocol allows the IAEA to carry out – under certain conditions – inspections anywhere in the country. The Additional Protocol is therefore necessary to provide confidence that Iran is not carrying out a secret nuclear program. Iran has already signed an Additional Protocol but has stopped its implementation and has not ratified it.

As the third element, Iran must limit its uranium enrichment program. Being able to enrich uranium brings a country closer to nuclear weapons capability. The more efficient the enrichment capacity and the higher the degree of enrichment, the more rapidly weapons-grade material can be produced and used to make a nuclear device. Iran can justify, with reference to the use of such material in the energy generation programs in other countries, enrichment of uranium to a level of up to 5%.

Continue reading →

Posted in Non-proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Regions | Tagged , , , | 3 Comments

DPRK Now 0-4 On Long-Range Missile Tests; Now Task Is to Prevent 3rd Nuclear Test

Posted on April 12, 2012 by

By Peter Crail and Daryl G. Kimball

North Korea's Unha-3 missile is readied for launch.

Today, the leaders of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) followed through with their plan to conduct a long-range ballistic missile test, which failed, according to early assessments.

The DPRK claimed the missile launch was intended to put a satellite in space, but many of the technologies used for that purpose also help North Korea further develop a long-range missile capability, which is was probably the DPRK’s real aim.

Though it was apparently unsuccessful, the missile launch is a clear violation of the UN Security Council demand that North Korea not conduct “any launch using ballistic missile technology.” It is also a violation of the DPRK’s pledge — announced February 29 — not to conduct further long-range ballistic missile tests, not to conduct further nuclear tests, and not to enrich uranium at its Yongbyon complex. Pyongyang had every reason to know that the launch violated the February 29 deal and would draw international condemnation.

This is not the first North Korean long-range missile test, nor the first failure. The DPRK has carried out three previous long-range rocket launches, all of which failed. All of those earlier tests are believed to have had different missile systems.

  • 1998: Taepodong 1—third stage failed
  • 2006: Taepodong 2—failed after 40 seconds
  • 2009: Taepodong 2/Unha 2—third stage failed

This is the first time that North Korea is re-testing a long-range rocket it launched before. The Unha-3 that North Korea launched looks very much like the Unha-2 it launched in 2009.

Continue reading →

Posted in Asia, Missile Technology, North Korea, Regions | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

Priorities for the Renewed Nuclear Talks with Iran

Posted on April 11, 2012 by

Sunrise behind the Blue Mosque in Istanbul, Turkey (Image Source: Getty)

By Daryl G. Kimball and Greg Thielmann

After a 15-month hiatus, the P5+1 and Iran will finally meet again to discuss Tehran’s nuclear program on Saturday, April 14 in Istanbul.

Iran’s diplomatic encounter with the six powers – China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the United States – will occur at a time of dramatically increased economic pressure on Iran from sanctions and against the backdrop of loose talk about counterproductive military strikes against Iran’s nuclear sites. Both sides need to make the most of the upcoming talks.

At such a time, it is more important than ever to address urgent priorities in order to make progress towards achieving long-term goals. Iran continues to improve its uranium enrichment capabilities and already has some of the materials and expertise needed to build nuclear weapons. But Tehran’s progress toward exercising a nuclear weapons option can be slowed and ultimately reversed.

Toward a Serious, Sustained Dialogue

Resolving the nuclear impasse will be exceedingly difficult and will not be accomplished in one meeting. There is an enormous deficit of trust between the sides and the political atmosphere in both Washington and Tehran conspire against offering the compromises that will be necessary.

A sustained, serious dialogue will be needed, consisting of high-level and technical meetings on a multilateral and bilateral basis. The best way to get this process underway is to focus on smaller, achievable steps, which address the highest priority proliferation risks. This would buy time for the larger and more ambitious steps ultimately required to convince Iran it is in its interests not to pursue nuclear weapons and to limit its options to do so.

Halting Enrichment Beyond Normal Fuel-Grade

The first priority must be to halt and reverse Iran’s accumulation of 20%-enriched uranium, which has the potential of significantly shortening the time Tehran would require to build nuclear weapons if it decided to break out of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

The United States has reportedly drafted a proposed confidence building measure that would require that Iran halt 20% enrichment and ship out the 20%-enriched uranium it has produced. In exchange, the P5+1 would provide Iran with fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and an agreement not to pursue an additional round of UN sanctions.

Continue reading →

Posted in Middle East, Nuclear Weapons, Regions | Tagged , , , , , | 4 Comments

Summit Successes Over Seoul-ed?

Posted on April 11, 2012 by

President Barack Obama (2nd R) speaks during the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit on March 27, 2012 in Seoul, South Korea. World leaders from 53 nations gathered to address the issues of nuclear security and preventing nuclear terrorism. (Image Source: Yonhap News)

By Benjamin Kagel and Kelsey Davenport

A panel of four foreign policy experts weighed in on missed opportunities from the recent nuclear security summit, held March 26-27 in Seoul, South Korea. Speaking at the National Press Club last Friday, the panel discussed global nuclear security and ways to prevent nuclear terrorism.

Robert Gallucci, former chief U.S. negotiator during the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994, said that nuclear terrorism is the “single most important threat” to the United States. Despite a global consensus supporting the need to strengthen nuclear security, President Obama’s open mic gaffe on missile defense overshadowed media coverage of the summit discussions—an indication, according to some experts, of the modest achievements made in Seoul.

Joseph Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund, called the Seoul summit an “underperforming summit” with a “minimalist agenda.” While the summit may have sped up national commitments already in progress since the 2010 Washington summit, Cirincione said the new achievements are “small potatoes” compared to what can and should be done.

His point is illustrated by a look at the progress made on highly enriched uranium (HEU) minimalization over the past two years. In a speech at the conclusion of the summit, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak called attention to the “major reduction in terms of volume” of nuclear materials citing the removal of 480 kilograms of civilian use HEU.  President Lee referred to this reduction in the global stockpile as a “core accomplishment” of the summits.

And he is right; this significant progress should be celebrated. But it is important to note that about half of the total reduction came from the Ukrainian HEU cleanout. According to the International Panel on Fissile Materials, there are still approximately 2,000 tons of fissile materials worldwide: about 1,450 tons of HEU and 550 tons of separated plutonium, enough nuclear material for tens of thousands of nuclear weapons.

Continue reading →

Posted in Nuclear Security | Tagged , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Kahl and Kroenig Debate Timing and Utility of Iran Strike

Posted on April 10, 2012 by

Dr. Colin Kahl, Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program and Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and Dr. Matthew Kroenig, Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations at a similar debate held at the Mortara Center for International Studies in March.

By Ari Kattan

Colin Kahl and Matthew Kroenig engaged in  another debate last week in their ongoing back-and-forth over the timing and utility of a potential preventive attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities.  The now-famous debate between these two former Defense Department officials and Georgetown University professors has been characterized as a discussion between polar-opposite views, but this depiction does not do justice to the nuance and complexity of the issue and their arguments.  Both Kahl and Kroenig saw a nuclear Iran as destabilizing and damaging to U.S. interests and neither has ruled out military action.  But they disagreed on the urgency of such military action and the threshold that would need to be crossed before the United States should use military force.

Kroenig opened up the debate by saying he believes a nuclear Iran is the greatest national security issue facing the United States.  In his view, there are three options vis-à-vis Iran: diplomatic action to halt their nuclear program, acquiescence to a nuclear-armed Iran, or military action to physically destroy their nuclear program.  Diplomatic action, he argued, will ultimately prove futile because the Iranian regime’s top priorities—regime survival and regional dominance—are both served by acquiring nuclear weapons.  Making a deal with the West and halting uranium enrichment to 20 percent does not advance their interests.  This leaves the United States to choose between acquiescence and military action.

In Kroenig’s view, a nuclear-armed Iran and its potential regional and international consequences are unacceptable.  He argued that if Iran acquired nuclear weapons, it could provide a nuclear umbrella to its proxies, making it harder to contain or retaliate against them without risking escalation that could lead to a nuclear exchange.  He also feared the risk of further proliferation in the Middle East and beyond.  Over the long-term, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and even Egypt could try and acquire nuclear weapons to balance Iran.  The damage to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) would also be substantial, with other countries, especially rouge states, concluding that they can get away with developing nuclear weapons.  Kroenig also disputed the claim that deterrence between Iran and Israel would work similar to how deterrence prevented nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union.  Israel and Iran do not have diplomatic relations and they are both in a much more unstable region. The clear communication of red-lines and the diplomatic ability to deescalate crises that existed during the Cold War does not exist between Israel and Iran, making deterrence potentially less effective.

Continue reading →

Posted in Iran, Middle East, Non-proliferation | Tagged , , | Leave a comment