Huge Advance in Chemical Weapons Arms Control

The MV Cape Ray at Portsmouth, Virginia.

The MV Cape Ray at Portsmouth, Virginia.

By Greg Thielmann

It was exactly one year ago that Syrian government forces unleashed poison gas attacks on an opposition-held suburb of Damascus, killing hundreds of innocent civilians. At the time, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad controlled the world’s second largest operational arsenal of chemical weapons, even though he did not acknowledge it. Shortly after the attacks, however, his government admitted holding some 1,300 metric tons of mustard agent and nerve gas precursor chemicals, chemical weapons manufacturing sites, and delivery systems.

Today, Syria is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which outlaws all development, possession, and use of poison gas; all of Syria’s declared arsenal has been removed from the country; and 86 percent of it has already been neutralized or incinerated. The prevention of further use of the most deadly chemical weapons on a large scale by the Syrian regime constitutes a stunning and underappreciated achievement.

A Taboo Is Strengthened

Poison gas was introduced by Germany onto the World War I battlefield almost a century ago. The tens of thousands of deaths on both sides resulting from its extensive use and the long-term suffering of surviving victims led to a widely supported international ban on chemical weapons use in the form of the “1925 Protocol.” The taboo on chemical weapons has been sufficiently strong to prevent its use in most of the wars conducted since.

However, some three decades back, the world witnessed the sustained, large-scale use of banned chemical weapons in Iraq’s 8-year war against Iran. The regime of Saddam Hussein, which had started the war by invading Iran, employed a variety of poison gases in attacks on Iranian soldiers and civilians alike, killing tens of thousands. Saddam also ordered the use of nerve gas against his own citizens – most notoriously in the March 1988 attack on the Kurdish city of Halabja. To their shame, the United States and some other Western powers were not only silent in the face of these atrocities; they assisted the military of the Iraqi perpetrators.

By the time Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, several other countries were still assessed to have active inventories of chemical weapons. The biggest holders by far were the Soviet Union and the United States. North Korea, Syria, Israel, Egypt, Libya, and Yugoslavia were also suspected of maintaining operational chemical weapons. In accordance with the cease-fire terms imposed on Iraq following the expulsion of Saddam’s troops from Kuwait by an international coalition in 1991, Iraq began the destruction of its chemical weapons arsenal.

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The Next Two Weeks Ahead, August 17-30: IAEA Amano Visits Iran; GGE on FMCT Meets; International Day Against Nuclear Tests

The following are some of the key arms control dates and developments to watch over the next two weeks. WeekAheadSOLO

For more news and analysis on these and other weapons-related security issues, consider subscribing to ACA’s monthly journal Arms Control Today, which is available in print/digital and digital-only editions.

- written and compiled by Tim Farnsworth

August 11-22: Group of Governmental Experts Meet on Fissile Material Treaty

A group of governmental experts (GGE) established by UN resolution A/RES/67/53, his holding the last two week-long session to make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to, but not negotiate, a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The group is charged with presenting a consensus report to the UN General Assembly 70th Session.

For more information and analysis about the FMCT, check out these Arms Control Association resources:

August 17: IAEA Director General Amano Meets with Iranian Leaders

Ahead of the the August 25 deadline for Iran to submit to the International Atomic Energy Agency information related to five areas of concern over its nuclear program, the agency’s director general, Yukiya Amano will head to Tehran to meet with key Iranian leaders and senior officials.

Two of the five areas of concern that Iran needs to report to the IAEA deals with the issue of past military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. For more information regarding the implementation of the Iran-IAEA Framework for cooperation and issues surrounding Iran’s past nuclear program, see:

August 29: International Day Against Nuclear Tests

On the 65th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s first nuclear test at the Semipalatinsk Test Site, now part of Kazakhstan, the world will come together to call for entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The 64th session of the United Nations General Assembly declared August 29 the International Day Against Nuclear Tests by adopting resolution 64/35.  The resolution was initiated by the Republic of Kazakhstan in order to build awareness of the ongoing efforts to educate policy makers and the public and advocate for the banning of nuclear tests in order to build a safer world. 2010 marks the first year for commemoration of the day and activities to build awareness now takes place around the world every year.

To commemorate this year’s International Day against Nuclear Tests, the UN General Assembly in New York will hold a special meeting on 10 September.

On the afternoon of September 15, the Embassy of Kazakhstan to the United States, Global Greens USA, and the Arms Control Association will host a mini-conference titled, “Nuclear Weapons Testing: History, Progress, Challenges, in Washington, D.C.

More details on both events will be posted as they become available.

For more information on the CTBT and efforts to ban nuclear tests, visit the Project for the CTBT site.

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The Time is Now For Countries to Discuss Autonomous Weapons Systems

The SGR-A1, developed for the North/South Korea border, can in theory fire a gun without human intervention, raising concerns about autonomous robots. (Copyright: Getty Images)

The SGR-A1, developed for the North/South Korea border, can in theory fire a gun without human intervention, raising concerns about autonomous robots. (Copyright: Getty Images)

By Brianna Starosciak

A new wave of “autonomous” weapons technology is on the horizon and many countries are discussing ways in which that new technology may be used in future military conflicts—and whether new rules to manage the risks posed those weapons are in order.

While lethal autonomous weapons systems are not deployed on the battlefield yet, their semi-autonomous precursors, such as drones, have been around for years. It is only a matter of time before their autonomous descendants join them on the battlefield.

There is no definition of lethal autonomous weapons systems under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), which has been a key mechanism used to address new weapons types. A May 13-16 informal meeting of CCW states parties determined that since lethal autonomous weapons systems are in their nascent stage and could evolve in many different ways, it is too early establish a definition for these weapons.

However, there are some key characteristics of lethal autonomous weapons systems that differentiate them from other types of weapons, the most important of which is that these robotic systems would be able to select a target and attack without any human intervention. In contrast, the unmanned aerial vehicles (a.k.a. drones) that are widely used today still require human intelligence to identify and engage targets.

Proponents of lethal autonomous weapons systems argue that they provide a number of useful characteristics, including: continuous operation for long periods of time in hostile environments, they are impervious to potential chemical and biological attack, they can communicate swiftly, and could record any potentially unethical or nefarious behavior in their zone of operation. Most importantly, proponents argue, the deployment of lethal autonomous weapons systems could keep more soldiers out of the line of fire.

On the other hand, a growing number of critics, such as Human Rights Watch and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, highlight significant issues of concern surrounding the development and potential use of lethal autonomous weapons systems. Some of these issues include their vulnerability to hacking, the potential for lowering the threshold of conflict, difficulty identifying friend and foe, the need to develop a code of ethics to guide their use in warfare, and the need to enforce rules governing state use of such weapons systems. Much farther into the future, critics note, there could be issues of robot self-awareness. At that point, lethal autonomous weapons systems could draw conclusions about their own status in society and the moral judgments of fellow soldiers or other human beings.

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Sixty-Nine Years After Hiroshima, Time for Renewed Action for Nuclear Disarmament and Human Survival

HIROSHIMA, JAPAN - AUGUST 05:  A-Bomb Dome is seen near Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park on August 5, 2010 in Hiroshima, Japan, on the eve of the 65th anniversary of the Hiroshima atomic bombing. The world's first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima by the United States during World War II, killing an estimated 70,000 people instantly with many thousands more dying over the following years from the effects of radiation. Three days later another atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki.  (Photo by Kiyoshi Ota/Getty Images)

A-Bomb Dome is seen near Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park on August 5, 2010 in Hiroshima, Japan,. (Photo by Kiyoshi Ota/Getty Images)

By Daryl G. Kimball

Since the devastating U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 69 years ago this week, the catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons have motivated ordinary citizens to push their leaders to pursue arms control and disarmament measures to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons use.

For decades, it has been well understood that the direct effects of a large-scale nuclear conflict could result in several hundred million human fatalities, while the indirect effects would be far greater, leading to the loss of billions of lives.

An April 1979 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency report found that an exchange of U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces involving a total of approximately 18,000 strategic warheads would kill 25-100 million people in both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Under the scenario examined, the population centers would not be targeted but would be within the range of effects of the weapons targeted against military and industrial targets. As a result, the 200 largest cities in each country would be destroyed and 80 percent of all cities with 25,000 people or more would be attacked by at least one nuclear weapon.

Since the end of the Cold War–and with strong public pressure for the conclusion of effective U.S.-Russian nuclear risk reduction and disarmament measures–the threat of a U.S.-Russian conflict has decreased, but the risk of a nuclear war remains.

In 2001, the United States and Russia formally adopted a policy of cooperation against common threats. On Nov. 13, 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin declared, “[t]he United States and Russia have overcome the legacy of the Cold War. Neither country regards the other as an enemy or threat.” 

Unfortunately, the United States and Russia are not exactly friends and their nuclear arsenals and strategy are still sized and oriented to engage in a protracted nuclear exchange that would devastate the other, many times over.

Clearly, current U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals far exceed what is necessary to deter a nuclear attack from being launched in the first place. Today, the U.S. and Russian strategic and tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles (not including warheads awaiting dismantlement) each exceed 5,000 nuclear bombs, any one of which could devastate Washington or Moscow.

As of March 1, 2014, the United States deployed 1,585 strategic nuclear warheads on 778 strategic bombers, land-based missiles, and submarine-based missiles, while Russia deployed 1,512 strategic warheads on 498 strategic delivery vehicles. Under the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), by the year 2018, each country is allowed to deploy no more than 1,550 strategic nuclear weapons on 700 missiles and bombers.

While further U.S.-Russian nuclear reductions are clearly in order, President Putin rebuffed President Obama’s June 2013 proposal to slash U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear stockpiles by another one-third below New START ceilings—to nearly 1,000 deployed strategic warheads.

On Dec. 25, Mikhail Ulyanov, director of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s security and disarmament department said, “[n]ow is the most inauspicious moment in the past 10-15 years to talk about further reductions.”

Actually, the United States and Russia need effective nuclear risk reduction measures now, more than ever.

While U.S. and Russian nuclear forces remain primed for prompt launch, renewed tensions between the two nuclear superpowers over Russia’s ongoing meddling in Ukraine raises the specter of a military conflict that could escalate into a catastrophic nuclear confrontation. Just one U.S. nuclear-armed submarine—loaded with 24 missiles, each armed with four 455-kiloton warheads—could kill millions.

A 2001 report by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) details the effects of a “precision” nuclear attack on nuclear forces in Russia. NRDC’s nuclear war simulation demonstrates that 8 to 12 million people would die in a U.S. attack on Russia’s nuclear forces, and more would die if other targets were included, such as military and political leadership and war-supporting infrastructure.

A 2001 report by the Natural Resources Defense Council details the effects of a "precision" nuclear attack on nuclear forces in Russia. This map shows how radioactive fallout would spread across the Russian landmass, creating lethal conditions over an area exceeding 300,000 square miles—larger in size than France and the United Kingdom. NRDC's nuclear war simulation demonstrates that between 8 and 12 million people would die in a U.S. attack on Russia’s nuclear forces; more would die if other targets, including military and leadership; war-supporting infrastructure were also included in the nuclear strike. (Source: “The U.S. War Plan: A Time for Change,” June 2001.)

This map shows how radioactive fallout would spread across the Russian landmass, creating lethal conditions over an area exceeding 300,000 square miles—larger in size than France and the United Kingdom. NRDC’s nuclear war simulation demonstrates that between 8 and 12 million people would die in a U.S. attack on Russia’s nuclear forces; more would die if other targets, including military and leadership; war-supporting infrastructure were also included in the nuclear strike. (Source: “The U.S. War Plan: A Time for Change,” June 2001.)

In other regions of the world, the number of nuclear weapons has slowly increased and the threat of nuclear annihilation has grown.

China has an estimated 240-300 nuclear weapons, no more than 50 of which are on intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. France has fewer than 300 operational nuclear warheads. The United Kingdom has fewer than 160 deployed strategic warheads and a total stockpile of up to 225 nuclear warheads. India is estimated to have about 100 nuclear warheads and Pakistan is estimated to have as many as 90 nuclear warheads. Israel, which has not officially acknowledged its nuclear arsenal, is believed to have between 75 to 200 nuclear warheads. North Korea’s arsenal is limited in size (it has enough fissile material for about 10 bombs) and range.

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Senate Skepticism on Iran Deal Overlooks Facts

Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 29.

Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 29.

By Jonah Aboni

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee quizzed Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman on the status of the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program at a hearing on Tuesday. Negotiators announced on July 19 a four- month extension of the talks on reaching a comprehensive nuclear agreement.

Many senators used this opportunity to continue to set unrealistic expectations for a final deal and ignored the important achievements made thus far.

The issues surrounding the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) negotiations with Iran are contentious and difficult to solve. But some members of the committee are not basing their concerns about an extension of the negotiations and the possible outcome on the facts, nor are some of them taking into account Iran’s compliance with the Joint Plan of Action (also known as the interim agreement) agreed to by the P5+1 and Iran in Nov. 2013.

Sen. Bob Menendez, (D-N.J.), chairman of the committee, in his opening statement said, “I’ve been sceptical of the Iranians’ sincerity from day one. And I cannot say that I am less sceptical today than I was six months ago.” Several others on the committee echoed his scepticism.

Such comments ignore the successes that have been achieved so far. It is a fact that Iran is complying with the interim agreement. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued monthly reports that show Iran has complied with its obligations under the interim agreement and the IAEA had all of the access it had requested to monitor the terms of the agreement. Given these facts, the intense scepticism about Iran’s follow-through on the interim deal is baffling.

It also clear that there has been a roll back of Iran’s nuclear program under the interim agreement. As pointed out by Sherman during the hearing, before the interim agreement Iran’s nuclear program was “becoming more dangerous” each passing day,.

However, the agreement has prevented Iran’s uranium-enrichment program from growing, put more extensive IAEA monitoring in place, and neutralized Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent enriched-uranium gas.

Several senators asked Sherman to assure Congress that the talks would not extend beyond the end of the four-month extension on Nov. 24. But declaring an end to further diplomatic efforts if a desired outcome is not achieved months in advance is not a smart policy.

While the negotiations are on going, negotiators should remain focused on clinching a good deal. What is important and clear is that, so far, there has been significant forward progress on key issues in the negotiations and Congress should be flexible and willing to consider viable options to reach a good, comprehensive nuclear deal.

Some senators also expressed concern about a possible covert nuclear weapons program and the strength of the inspection regime, including Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.).

But these concerns can only be addressed with the adoption of the more extensive Additional Protocol “plus” monitoring and verification mechanisms as part of the deal. Transparency, monitoring, and intrusive verification are absolutely critical to any agreement that will be reached.

As Sherman pointed out “one of the pathways of greatest concern is, of course covert action. And transparency and monitoring are the elements that help to ensure that if there are covert actions one knows it in time to be able to take action to stop it from happening in the first place.”

It is also far-fetched to describe the on-going efforts as an embarrassing diplomatic and a national security failure, as Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) said during the July 29 hearing

In reality, current diplomatic efforts have yielded positive results. Iran has complied with all its obligations under the interim agreement and has been more transparent with its nuclear program than ever before. The efforts have succeeded in rolling back Iran’s nuclear program. There will continue to be monitoring and intrusive verification to ensure Iran does not cheat on a future, comprehensive nuclear deal. All of this is happening because of the diplomatic efforts.

War is not a good option and sanctions alone are not sufficient. The current diplomatic process is the best option available to guard against a nuclear-armed Iran and it deserves the full support of Congress, not the ill-informed derision of Senator Rubio.

Other members of Congress should check the record and not dismiss the efforts and the achievements that have been made so far. A comprehensive P5+1 nuclear agreement with Iran is by no means assured, but it is clear that a good deal is better than no deal, and responsible Senate and House members must give diplomacy every chance and the time necessary to succeed.

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The P5+1 and Iran Nuclear Talks Alert, July 28

IRAN-NUCLEAR-POLITICS By the research staff of the Arms Control Association. To get this P5+1 and Iran Nuclear Talks Alert delivered to your inbox, sign-up now.

Political-Level Talks Resume in Early September

Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif told an Iranian news agency on July 22 that nuclear negotiations between the Iranian and the P5+1 political directors would resume in early September.

After nearly three weeks of intense talks, negotiators agreed on July 19 to extend the provisions of the interim agreement and negotiations for about four months. The extension ends on Nov. 24, the one-year anniversary of the interim agreement reached by Iran and the P5+1 in Geneva.

At the time the extension was announced, negotiators did not say when talks would resume, but said in a joint statement that the parties would “reconvene in the coming weeks in different formats.” Western officials have said that expert level meetings could begin again in late August.

State Department deputy spokesperson Marie Harf said in the July 21 press briefing that the meetings will resume “hopefully in the next weeks” and that the talks over the next few months will be a combination of experts meetings, bilateral and multilateral meetings.

It also remains undecided where the talks will take place. Over the past six months, negotiations on the comprehensive agreement have taken place in Vienna.

Many key U.S. officials involved in the negotiations will be consulting with Congress about the status of the negotiations over the break, including during Senate and House hearings on Tuesday.

–KELSEY DAVENPORT,  nonproliferation analyst 

Many Senators Think Its Unwise to Spell Out Terms of Deal

Senators on both sides of the aisle think that a proposed letter  to President Barack Obama co-authored by Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) and Sen. Lindsay Graham (R-S.C.) goes too far in prescribing what a nuclear deal with Iran should look like. As of Friday, July 25, the letter has not been sent and it is unclear how many Senators have signed on. Graham has said the goal was to reach 30 signatures.

The Menendez-Graham letter, first reported by Reuters, has been circulating for signatures since July 11. It calls for dismantlement of Iran’s “illicit nuclear infrastructure,” including the enrichment facility at Fordow and the Arak heavy water reactor. Graham says he will not support lifting sanctions on Iran if the agreement does not meet the specific terms spelled out in the letter.

Several senators that have signed letters in the past that spell out what the United States should push for in a deal have decided not to support this most recent attempt.

A report in National Journal on July 25 quotes several Senators who have decided not to sign on to the letter, including Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) who said that he did not want to “gratuitously condemn or throw out suggestions as to what the right solution should be.”

Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.) also decided not to sign the letter, although he thought it made some good points. Reed was quoted in the same National Journal piece as saying that Congress should “allow the negotiators to reach a position and then evaluate if it is effective.”

Both Reed and Sessions signed an earlier letter in March written by Graham and Menendez that laid out conditions for a deal.

The language requiring dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure in this most recent letter undercuts U.S. diplomats at the negotiating table. It is also unnecessary. Both Arak and Fordow can be repurposed to limit their proliferation potential as part of a strictly monitored and limited Iranian nuclear program.

“I don’t want to do anything to undermine the negotiations,” Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) told National Journal. Levin is the chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee. “I think it’s a mistake to put in stone what I would vote against unless certain criteria were met,” he said.

GOP Senators Want to Vote on Deal, Bar Extension of Talks

Sens. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), John McCain (R-Ariz.) and James Risch (R-Idaho) introduced legislation last week that would require an up-or-down vote in the House and Senate on any comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran within a month of its completion. The goal, according a press release from the office of Senator Corker, would be to prevent implementation of a final agreement if a veto-proof majority of Congress disapproves of the deal. The bill would also prohibit an extension of the negotiations beyond the November 24 deadline.

Clearly Congress wants and is playing an important role in the process, but an automatic vote on the agreement in the politically-charged House and Senate is not the most prudent or productive way for it to do so.

Such a vote risks the premature rejection of the diplomatic solution to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran that the majority of members of Congress say they want. The vote would come well before Iran’s willingness to follow through on its commitments can even be tested.

While the conclusion of an effective comprehensive agreement is in the U.S. national security interest, a prohibition on P5+1 talks with Iran beyond the November 24 negotiating deadline unnecessarily constrains the diplomatic process and ignores the negative consequences of terminating the interim agreement, know as the Joint Plan of Action, which has verifiably halted the most worrisome aspects of Iran’s nuclear program for the past six months.

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The Week Ahead, July 28 – August 1: Congressional Hearings on Iran Nuclear Talks; CD Begins Final Session; House Hearing on North Korea; Unfinished Congressional Business; Compliance Report Due

The following are some of the key arms control dates and developments to watch over the next week. WeekAheadSOLO

For more news and analysis on these and other weapons-related security issues, consider subscribing to ACA’s monthly journal Arms Control Today, which is available in print/digital and digital-only editions.

- written and compiled by Tim Farnsworth

July 29: Senate and House Hearings on P5+1 and Iran Nuclear Talks

At 10am the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will hold a hearing on the P5+1 Talks with Iran. Witnesses include lead U.S. negotiator, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Wendy Sherman, and the Treasury Department’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, David Cohen.

At 2pm, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs will hold its own hearing on the P5+1 Talks with Iran. Undersecretaries Sherman and Cohen will testify. The hearing will be webcast live.

July 28 – Sept. 12: The UN Conference on Disarmament Begins Third Session

The UN Conference on Disarmament will begin its third and final session of the year on July 28 through September 12, in Geneva, Switzerland. Except for a Group of Governmental Experts that is working this year and next on technical concepts and issues regarding a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, the CD has not been able to reach consensus on a work-plan that would allow negotiations to move forward on key issues.

See: “Disarmament Consensus Eludes UN,”by Tom Collina, Arms Control Today, November 2013.

July 30: House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee Hearing on North Korea

The six-party talks (China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States) over North Korea’s on-going nuclear and missile programs have been stalled since 2009, when North Korea launched the three-stage Unha-2 rocket and conducted its second nuclear test explosion.  Recent trips to China by U.S. officials, including President Barack Obama, have aimed at finding ways to restart the talks.

The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific will hold a hearing on “Twenty-Years of U.S. Policy on North Korea: From Agreed Framework to Strategic Patience,” with Glyn Davies, special representative for North Korea policy and Robert King, special envoy for North Korean human rights from the U.S. State Department.

For more information and analysis on North Korea’s nuclear program and the efforts by the United States and other world powers to dismantle its program, see:

August 1 – September 7:  Summer Recess for Congress

Starting August 1, Congress will take a little more than a month off from their work in Washington, D.C. and head back to their districts to meet with their constituents.  They leave with unfinished business on several key arms control issues. One issue that remains is the passing of Senate’s version of the defense authorization bill, S. 2410, which was voted out of committee June 2. The House version, HR. 4435, which was passed in May, includes provisions calling for the acceleration of missile defense deployment in Europe as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach and raised questions about implementation of the New START Treaty.

State Department Arms Control Compliance Assessment Due Soon

The U.S. State Department said in January that Russia may have committed a technical violation of the INF Treaty by testing a new type of cruise missile. At the time, administration officials said no final determination had been made about the possible violation and the specific allegations were not revealed. The Obama administration is expected address the issue in its annual report to Congress on arms control compliance, which is due to be released very soon.

For background and analysis, see: “No Evidence of INF Treaty Violation in 2013 Compliance Report,” by Greg Thielmann in

“Russia Should Uphold Its INF Treaty Commitments,” ACA Issue Brief, by Tom Collina, May 23, 2014.

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