Former Secretary of State Shultz Reiterates Support for CTBT

George Shultz walking with President Reagan outside the White House in December 1986.

George Shultz walking with President Reagan outside the White House in December 1986.

By Daryl G. Kimball

At a March 8 public forum, former Secretary of State George Shultz underscored once again his support for U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Shultz’s remarks came in response to a question following his talk at an event organized by the Partnership for a Secure America on Capitol Hill.

Shultz was asked for his “personal view on whether the U.S. should ratify the test ban treaty as a way to enhance U.S. security?”

Shultz, who served as President Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of State from 1982-1989, said: “Yes I clearly think we should ratify that treaty.”

“This issue has kind of lost its attention and we need to get back on the offense. And here’s the way to get back on the offense,” Shultz continued.

“I would say that in some ways a Senator … Senator Nunn might put it this way … a Senator might have been right to vote against it when it was first put forward and right to vote for it now,” he said.

“Why? Because things have changed. Its now not just an idea that we can detect tests. There is a network that has built out now and has been demonstrated that we can detect all, even small tests.”

Shultz went on to note that the nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship program has also been very successful and in the past nuclear tests were conducted primarily to develop new types of nuclear weapons and so, he said, we have no need to test today.

“I find it hard to see how we would justify going and producing a new nuclear weapon, we have quite an arsenal right now.”

In their influential January 2007 joint op-ed in The Wall Street Journal, Shultz, along with Henry Kissinger, William Perry, and former Senator Sam Nunn called for:

“Initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate, including understandings to increase confidence and provide for periodic review, to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure ratification by other key states.”

Following President Obama’s April 5, 2009 pledge to pursue CTBT ratification ”immediately and aggressively,” Shultz said on April 17, 2009 in Rome:

“[Republicans] might have been right voting against [the CTBT] some years ago, but they would be right voting for it now, based on these new facts…. [There are] new pieces of information that are very important and that should be made available to the Senate.”

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The Cost of Ignoring UN Inspectors: An Unnecessary War with Iraq

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei (L) and UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Hans Blix (R) brief the UN Security Council on Iraq inspections March 7, 2003

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei (L) and UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Hans Blix (R) brief the UN Security Council on Iraq inspections March 7, 2003

By Greg Thielmann

On March 7, ten years ago, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNMOVIC) reported to the UN Security Council on the latest results of their inspections in Iraq, monitoring enforcement of the Council’s demand that Saddam Hussein eliminate his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related programs.

The IAEA’s Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, and UNMOVIC’s Executive Chairman, Hans Blix, both reported progress, following the return of UN inspectors to Iraq in November 2002, in resolving critical questions about the current status of Iraq’s WMD programs.

Based on more than a hundred visits to suspect sites and private interviews with a number of individual scientists known to have been involved with WMD programs in the past, ElBaradei stated that the IAEA had “to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq” and predicted that the agency should be able to provide that Security Council with an objective and thorough assessment of Iraq’s nuclear related capabilities “in the near future.”

Blix reported that destruction of Iraq’s al Samoud ballistic missiles, which had exhibited ranges beyond that allowed by the UN, was underway. Concerning the status of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons programs, Blix was less categorical. No stockpiles or active programs had been found, but it had not yet been possible to document destruction of all the weapons known to have been produced prior to the 1991 Gulf War. Blitz predicted that months but not years, would be needed to complete the job.

Washington Dismisses the Inspectors’ Findings

The Bush administration’s response to the inspectors’ reports was swift and negative, because their conclusions contradicted the allegations previously made by the U.S. government – for example, with regard to the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi WMD. The next day, President George W. Bush delivered a radio address to the American people, arguing that the inspection teams did not need any more time, because Saddam was “still refusing to disarm.”

Given Saddam Hussein’s “long history of reckless aggression and terrible crimes,” the United States needed to be willing to use military force rather than waiting “to see what [he] would do with weapons of mass destruction.”

The administration was meanwhile seeking to win UN Security Council authorization to use military force against Iraq to achieve WMD disarmament. Prospects for receiving even a simple majority were uncertain, and three of the other four permanent (veto-wielding) members were opposed, so the issue was never put to a vote.

Eleven days later, the United States delivered an ultimatum for Saddam Hussein to surrender power. On March 19, 2003, U.S. and U.K. military forces invaded Iraq. The “shock and awe” military campaign that followed was short, but the subsequent occupation was long and bloody.

For the United States, the war cost 4,800 fatalities, 32,000 wounded, and hundreds of billions of dollars. As real, but less tangible, the war generated increased hostility among both allies and adversaries alike, and diverted resources and attention from the war in Afghanistan. For Iraq, of course, the costs of the invasion and occupation were far greater.

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Better Odds on Iran Negotiations After Almaty?

By Kelsey Davenport

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Ambassador Thomas Pickering speaks at an Arms Control Association event on Feb. 25 on what can be accomplished in 2013 in negotiations with Iran. Photo Credit: Jackie Barrientes/ACA

Career Ambassador Thomas Pickering said at a Feb. 25 Arms Control Association event that he would be “willing to put a little money” on progress toward a positive outcome in negotiations with Iran in 2013.  After the conclusion of the Feb. 26-27 talks between Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany) in Almaty, Kazakhstan, Ambassador Pickering’s odds may have just gotten a little better. There were two positive outcomes discernable from the early reporting out of Kazakhstan. First, the parties have agreed on the dates and venues for two more meetings, and second, the P5+1 demonstrated that it is willing to put more substantive sanctions relief on the table in return for Iranian concessions.

More Talks

The parties announced that an experts meeting would convene in Istanbul on March 18, followed by another high-level political meeting on April 5-6 in Kazakhstan. Pickering stressed the importance of regular meetings in his Feb. 25 remarks, particularly at the experts level, saying that it would be “very helpful” for the experts to talk, and get a sense of Iran’s plan for its nuclear program and assess Iran’s actual need for low-enriched uranium. Pickering noted that one of the things that bothers the P5+1 the most is Iran’s “large accumulation of LEU with no apparent use for it.”

Sanctions Relief

Perhaps even more significant are press reports that the revised P5+1 proposal presented to Iran during the Almaty talks contained sanctions relief beyond the spare aircraft parts that were put on the table in 2012. Sanctions relief on the table includes relaxing measures restricting the gold trade and dealings with the petrochemical industry, and some small-scale banking restrictions.

While sanctions relief could modestly help Iran’s economy, which has been hard hit by unilateral and international sanctions, the offer also carries important symbolic weight. Also speaking at ACA’s Feb. 25 event, former Iranian nuclear negotiator Seyed Hossein Mousavian said that the view from Tehran is that “more sanctions and pressures” convince Iranians that the “U.S. is not ready for a serious genuine, meaningful talks.”

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NATO agrees on new arms control body

By Oliver Meier

A German Luftwaffe Tornado fighter-bomber capable of carrying nuclear gravity bombs.

A German Luftwaffe Tornado fighter-bomber capable of carrying nuclear gravity bombs.

(BERLIN) On Feb. 8, NATO agreed on the mandate of a new arms control body. Allies tasked the “Special Advisory and Consultative Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Committee” to prepare a dialogue on confidence building and transparency measures on tactical weapons with Russia. Potentially, the new body could also deal with other arms control-related issues, including a dialogue between Russia and the United States about further nuclear cuts.

Agreement in principle to establish a new arms control committee had been reached at the May 2012 NATO summit. In Chicago, allies had adopted the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) report in which they agreed “to establish a committee as a consultative and advisory forum, with its mandate to be agreed by the [North Atlantic Council] following the Summit.”

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is NATO’s highest political decision-making body. Continue reading

Posted in Europe, Nuclear Weapons, Russia, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Uncategorized | Tagged , , , , | Leave a comment

A First Look at the February 2013 IAEA Report on Iran

By Tom Z. Collina and Kelsey Davenport

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) February 2013 quarterly report on Iran’s nuclear program, Tehran is continuing to develop its nuclear program and slowly enhancing its nuclear weapons breakout potential. While this progress is troubling, Iran still remains years away from having a workable nuclear arsenal.

IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria

IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria

The IAEA’s February 2013 report (PDF), which was leaked to reporters today, indicates that Iran has begun installing, for the first time, advanced second-generation centrifuges in the Fuel Enrichment Plant of the Natanz facility, which produces uranium enriched to reactor grade, or 3.5 percent.

According to the previous report, issued in November 2012, the second-generation centrifuges, or IR-2Ms, were only installed in the research and development area at Natanz, referred to as the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant. When operating, the IR-2Ms could significantly increase Iran’s enrichment capabilities.

Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 20 percent has also increased since the November IAEA report. According to the new February 2013 report, Iran has produced 280 kg of uranium enriched to 20 percent (an addition of 47 kg). Of that amount, about 111 kg has been fed into the conversion process at Esfahan, which converts the uranium hexafluoride gas to uranium oxide, a solid form suitable for fabricating fuel plates to produce medical isotopes at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). This leaves 167 kg of uranium enriched to 20 percent in Iran’s available stockpile, an increase of 32 kg from the November 2012 report. The November 2012 report noted that the total production of uranium enriched to 20 percent was 232 kg, of which 96 kg were slated for conversion to uranium oxide powder.

Despite this increase of available 20 percent enriched uranium, Iran remains short of the amount needed for one bomb, if enriched further to weapons-grade (90 percent enriched U-235). Iran would need approximately 250 kg of 20% material available in gaseous form to reach that point. Continue reading

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Nuclear North Korea: the View from Seoul

Robert Gallucci, former U.S. negotiator with North Korea at the 2013 Asan Nuclear Forum.

Robert Gallucci, former U.S. negotiator with North Korea at the 2013 Asan Nuclear Forum.

By Kelsey Davenport

(Seoul, Republic of Korea)—North Korea’s third nuclear test on Feb. 12 sparked concern in the international community about possible qualitative and quantitative improvements to Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal. But concerns about an increasing number of nuclear weapons on the Peninsula should not solely be limited to the North.

Recent polling data collected by the Asan Institute indicates that the majority of South Korean favor acquiring their own nuclear arsenal. A public opinion poll conducted Feb. 13-15, 66.5 percent of South Korean’s polled said Seoul should develop its own nuclear weapons program, and 67 percent said that U.S. tactical nuclear weapons should be re-deployed in South Korea.

Not only is U.S policy toward North Korea failing to curb its nuclear program, but Pyongyang’s continued progress is threating the future of the nonproliferation regime.

While it is unlikely that South Korea will immediately follow in Pyongyang’s footsteps and withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty  (NPT) in order to pursue nuclear weapons, or that the United States would re-deploy nuclear weapons in South Korea after having withdrawn them nearly 22 years ago, these numbers should serve as a wake-up call to policymakers: the current strategy for dealing with North Korea is not working, and with Pyongyang committed to moving forward on its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, it is time to get serious about returning to negotiations.

As Robert Gallucci, former U.S. negotiator with North Korea, warned in his keynote address at the 2013 Asan Nuclear Forum, which began Feb. 19: “The growing nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs in the North will lead the governments of other countries in the region to reconsider their commitment to non-nuclear status and the non-proliferation regime will unravel.”

Moving Forward

At the 2013 Asan Nuclear Forum, the question of how to engage with North Korea figured prominently on the agenda of the first day.

Gallucci offered a sober assessment of U.S. policy toward North Korea saying “the policy we have pursued over the last 20 years – engagement, containment, whatever – it has failed to reduce the threat posed by North Korea to the security of the region.”

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Obama Renews Commitment to Reducing Nuclear Weapons Threat

By Daryl G. Kimball

President Obama in the State of the Union Address Feb. 12: "America will continue to lead the effort to prevent the spread of the world’s most dangerous weapons."

President Obama in the State of the Union Address Feb. 12: “America will continue to lead the effort to prevent the spread of the world’s most dangerous weapons.”

Barack Obama’s State of the Union pledge to continue “to lead the effort to prevent the spread of the world’s most dangerous weapons” represents a renewal of the President’s commitment to pursue a step-by-step plan toward a world without nuclear weapons, which he first outlined in Prague on April 5, 2009.

In his address, the President made it clear that he will press forward to find a diplomatic solution to the most urgent nuclear proliferation challenge — Iran — just days ahead of the next round of talks between Tehran and the “P5+1″ group, and that Iran must comply with its nonproliferation obligations.

To improve the chances of a breakthrough, the U.S. and P5+1 negotiators must adjust their tactics and focus on the most important, near-term nonproliferation goals: restricting (not permanently suspending) Iran’s uranium enrichment and securing Iranian agreement to more-intrusive international inspections to ensure that Tehran has halted all weapons-related work.

The President also made it clear that the United States will continue to seek to reduce the size the still bloated U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. Today, the United States deploys some 1,700 strategic nuclear warheads and Russia deploys some 1,500 strategic warheads. Each side retains thousands more nuclear warheads in storage.

Most U.S. and Russian deployed strategic nuclear weapons are still poised for launch within minutes, which Obama has said “is a dangerous relic of the Cold War. Such policies increase the risk of catastrophic accidents or miscalculation. I believe that we must address this dangerous situation—something that President Bush promised to do when he campaigned for president back in 2000, but did not do once in office.” Continue reading

Posted in CTBT, Iran, New START, Non-proliferation, North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, Russia, Uncategorized | Tagged , , | 2 Comments